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Peter B. Taylor  
 
 This action is an appeal of a grant of summary judgment to the 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service on the designation of critical-
habitat for the dusky gopher frog under the ESA. Landowner appellants 
originally sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Service, the 
Department of Interior, and agency officials challenging the designation 
of their private property as critical-habitat for the dusky gopher frog. The 
court’s holdings recognize loss of property value as a “particularized 
injury” for standing under the ESA in addition to addressing the 
landowners’ three principal arguments: 1) the critical habitat designation 
violated the ESA and the APA; 2) USFWS lacked constitutional authority 
under the Commerce Clause to make the critical-habitat designation; and 
3) the designation violated the NEPA. The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, and the case will be heard as Weyerhaeuser Co. v. 
United States Fish & Wildlife Service.  
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 In 2010, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”) 
designated 1,544 acres in St. Tammy Parish, Louisiana (“Unit 1”) as 
critical-habitat for the dusky gopher frog.1 Unit 1 has not been occupied 
by the dusky gopher frog for decades and is privately owned by 
plaintiff/appellants Markle Interest L.L.C., P&F Monroe Properties, 
L.L.C., and Weyerhaeuser Company (“Landowners”).2 Additionally, 
Weyerhaeuser Company holds a timber lease on Unit 1 that expires in 
2043.3 Although the Court addressed article III standing concerns, the 
predominate questions in this case revolved around the merits of 
designating unoccupied lands as critical-habitat under the Endangered 
Species Act (“ESA”), the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution, and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).  
    
 
 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Rana Sevosa, the dusky gopher frog (“the Frog”), was listed as an 
endangered species under the ESA in 2001, with approximately 100 Frogs 
known to exist in the wild.4 The Frog was historically located in parts of 
                                                     
1.  Markle Interests L.L.C v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 827 F.3d 
452, 459 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Servs., 138 S.Ct. 924 (2018). 
2. Id.   
3. Id.   
4. Id. at 458 n. 4. 
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Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, but only exists in Mississippi today.5 
When determining factors important to the Frogs’ critical habitat 
designation, the Service noted that the Frogs spend the bulk of their lives 
underground in open-canopied pine forest, then migrate to ephemeral 
ponds to breed.6 Ephemeral ponds are defined by a cycle of seasonal 
flooding followed by a period of drying up, which makes it impossible for 
predatory fish to survive.7 Ephemeral ponds are not common in the Frogs’ 
range and their locations were a primary consideration when the Service 
looked to expand the critical habitat designation beyond the original 
proposed rule, which only designated areas currently occupied by the 
Frog.8 
 In 2010 the Service published the original proposed rule 
designating 1,957 acres in Mississippi as critical habitat for the Frog.9 Due 
to concerns raised during the peer-review process that the original 
proposed area was not sufficient, the Service’s final designation was 
expanded to 6,477 acres, located in four counties in Mississippi and one 
parish in Louisiana.10 The designated area in Louisiana, Unit 1, has a total 
area of 1,544 acres.11 The Service’s “final critical-habitat designation was 
the culmination of two proposed rules, economic analysis, two rounds of 
notice and comment, a scientific peer- review process including responses 
from six experts, and a public hearing.”12     
 
III. PROCEEDINGS AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 This case arrived before the court on an appeal of a grant of 
summary judgment by the lower court.13 The Landowners filed for 
declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging only the Service’s 
designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat.14 Ultimately, the district court 
granted summary judgement in favor of the Landowners on the issue of 
standing, and in favor of the Service on the critical habitat designation.15  
 Review of the Services’ alleged maladministration of the ESA is 
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), not under the 
citizen-suit provision of the ESA. Under the APA a court must “set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be, (A) arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; [or] in 
                                                     
5. Id. at 458.  
6. Id.  
8. Id. 
8. Id. at 466. 
9. Id. at 459.    
10.  Id.  
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id.  
14. Id.  
15. Id. 
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excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.”16 Additionally, 
review under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard is “extremely limited 
and highly deferential.”17  
 
IV.   ANALYSIS 
 
A.   Endangered Species Act 
 
 The primary objective of the ESA is to conserve the ecosystems 
upon which endangered species depend, allowing the species to survive 
and recover from their endangered or threatened status.18 The Service has 
two primary functions under the ESA: first, to identify and list endangered 
and threatened species and second, to designate, “to the maximum extent 
prudent and determinable,” the species’ critical habitat.19 Critical habitat 
designation benefits the listed species by requiring federal agencies to 
consult, under Section 7 of the ESA, with the Service prior to authorizing, 
funding, or carrying out any action that could result in habitat “destruction 
or adverse modification.”20  
 
1.   Standing 
  
 To establish article III standing, the plaintiff in an action must 
show they have suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the 
defendant’s action and likely redressed by a favorable decision.21 
Additionally, the injury must be both concrete and particularized and 
actual or imminent.22 Under the APA the court typically applies the zone-
of-interest test to establish standing, but neither the district court nor the 
Service in its appeal briefed this issue.23 Therefore, the Court declined to 
consider the zone-of-interest test.24 
 The Landowners alleged two potential injuries to establish 
standing: 1) loss of future development, and 2) loss of property value.25 
The court disposed of the plaintiff’s first alleged injury finding that the 
                                                     
16. Id. at 460 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)). 
17. Id. (citing Gulf Restoration Network v. McCarthy, 783 F.3d 227, 
243 (5th Cir. 2015)).  
18. Id. at 460-461.   
19. Id. at 461. 
20. Id. (clarifying a common misconception, the court noted that 
private entities and private property owners are not subject to Section 7 
consultation). 
21. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 
(1992)). 
22. Id. at 462. 
23. Id. (to meet the zone of interest test “a plaintiff must show that 
‘the interest sought to be protected by the [plaintiff] is arguably within the zone of 
interest to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in 
question’”)  
24. Id. at 464. 
25. Id. at 462.    
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injury was too speculative.26 However, the court found the Landowners 
established standing on their second alleged injury, loss of property 
value.27 The Service’s Final Economic Analysis recognized that 
designating land as critical-habitat stigmatizes the property, “can cause 
real economic effects to property owners,” and can lower the market value 
of the property “due to perceived limitations and restrictions.”28 The loss 
in value is presumed by the Service to occur at the moment of critical 
habitat designation; therefore, the injury is traceable to the designation, 
concrete, actual, and able to be redressed by a favorable judicial 
outcome.29  
 
2.   Critical Habitat Designation 
 
 Under the ESA, the Service can designate two types of critical 
habitat: 1) areas occupied by the endangered species at the time of listing, 
and 2) areas unoccupied by the species at the time of listing.30 These two 
areas are designated under distinct criteria. To designate an occupied area, 
the Service must demonstrate that the area contains “those physical or 
biological features essential to the conservation of the species.”31 To 
designate an unoccupied area, the Service must determine that the area is 
“essential to the conservation of the species.”32 Under regulations that 
existed at the time of the Frog’s listing, designation of unoccupied areas 
could only be made after a peer review process determined that a 
“designation limited to [a species’] present range would be inadequate to 
ensure conservation of the species.”33 After the peer review process of the 
initial critical habitat designation proposal was complete, the Service 
amended the designation to include Unit 1 because of a finding of habitat 
insufficiency in the original proposal.  
 The three “physical or biological features” that define the Frog’s 
habitat are: “(1) ephemeral ponds used for breeding, (2) upland, open-
canopy forests “adjacent to and accessible to and from breeding ponds,” 
and (3) upland connectivity habitat to allow the frog to move between 
breeding and nonbreeding habitats.”34 Following the peer-review 
processes’ finding of habitat insufficiency, the Service examined areas that 
were “essential for conservation of the species.”35 Because of the rarity of 
ephemeral ponds and the extreme difficulty involved in their replication 
                                                     
26. Id.  
27. Id. at 463. 
28. Id.  
29. Id.  
30. Id. at 464.  
31. Id.; see footnote 12 containing the definition of “primary 
constituent elements.”   
32. Markle, 827 F.3d at 464.  
33. Id. at 465 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(e) (2012)) (emphasis in 
original). 
34. Id. at 464 (citing to footnote 12).  
35. Id. at 466. 
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of ephemeral ponds, the Service used the existence of natural ephemeral 
ponds as the primary criteria for selecting unoccupied areas.36 Unit 1 
contains five ephemeral ponds that are “intact and of remarkable 
quality.”37 The Service therefore concluded “the five ponds in Unit 1 
provide breeding habitat that in its totality is not known to be present 
elsewhere within the historic range of the Frog.”38 However, as the dissent 
points out, despite the existence of ephemeral ponds in Unit 1, without 
additional modifications it will still be unable to sustain a population of 
frogs.39 
  The court first examined the congressional intent of the term 
“essential,” as it is contained in the statute for defining unoccupied 
territory as critical habitat. The court noted that because Congress was 
silent or ambiguous as to the exact definition of “essential,” the Service’s 
interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference.40 However, the 
Landowners’ arguments were not based on whether the Service’s 
interpretation deserves deference, but rather on whether the Service’s 
interpretation was reasonable under the “plain meaning” of the term 
“essential” and within the limits of the ESA.41 
 The court summarized the Landowners’ arguments against 
classifying Unit 1 as critical habitat into three parts, though they are all 
interconnected. First, the Landowner’s proposed it was an unreasonable 
interpretation of the ESA to classify land that is not currently habitable by 
the Frog as “essential” for the conservation of the species (“habitability 
argument”).42 Second, the Landowners proposed it was unreasonable to 
classify Unit 1 as critical habitat because Unit 1 did not currently support 
“the conservation of the species in any way,” and the Service had “no 
reasonable basis to believe it will do so at any point in the foreseeable 
future” (“temporal argument”).43 Finally, the Landowners argued that the 
designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat was inappropriate because the 
Service’s interpretation of the term “essential” was unreasonable because 
it is beyond the limits of Service’s power under the ESA.44 
 The Landowner’s habitability and temporal arguments hinge on 
the fact that Unit 1 did not currently support the conservation of the Frog, 
and without significant inputs and modifications from the Landowners, 
which are not foreseeable, Unit 1 would never support the conservation of 
the Frog. The Court disposed of both arguments by a plain reading of the 
statute and regulations, finding the ESA requires the Service to designate 
“essential” unoccupied habitat and does not further define essential to 
                                                     
36. Id. 
37. Id.  
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 480 (Owen, J., dissenting). 
40. Id. at 467.   
41. Id. at 468.  
42. Id.   
43. Id. at 469 (emphasis in original).  
44. Id. at 470.  
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mean habitable.45 If the Service or the Court were to recognize the 
Landowner’s definition of “essential” as “habitable,” this would erase the 
distinction between occupied and unoccupied areas, and change the 
designation of unoccupied critical habitat under the ESA.46 Likewise, the 
court found Landowners temporal arguments for foreseeable habitability 
were not supported in the text of the ESA.47 The court noted that the ESA 
does not require the Service to have a specific plan for when the 
unoccupied critical habitat will be used, only that it identify areas that are 
“essential for the conservation of the species.”48  
 The Landowner’s next contended that the Service interpreted the 
ESA and the term “essential” in such a manner that placed no “meaningful 
limits” on the Service’s ability to designate unoccupied areas as 
essential.49 However, the court disagreed and noted several limitations on 
the Service’s ability to designate unoccupied areas. First, unoccupied areas 
cannot be designated as critical habitat unless the Service has first 
established that occupied areas are inadequate for species protection.50 
Second, unoccupied areas can only be designated if they are “essential for 
the conservation of the species.”51 Finally, the ESA requires the Service to 
use “the best scientific data available,” which further confines the 
Service’s ability to stretch the designation of unoccupied areas.52 Since the 
Landowners did not dispute the Service’s scientific findings or their 
factual support that Unit 1 was essential, the court rejected the argument 
that the Service exceeded its statutory authority and accepted the Service’s 
designation of Unit 1.53  
 
3.   Economic Decision Not to Exclude Unit 1 
  
 When designating critical habitat under the ESA, the Service is 
required to consider the economic impacts of designating any particular 
area.54 The Landowners argued that the Service’s decision not to exclude 
Unit 1 was arbitrary and capricious because the potential economic loss of 
future development was disproportionate to the biological benefit for the 
Frog.55 Citing the potential loss of up to $33.9 million, the Landowners 
sought judicial review of the Service’s final conclusion.56 The court found: 
                                                     
45. Id. at 468.  
46. Id.   
47. Id. at 469.  
48. Id.   
49. Id. at 470. 
50. Id.  
51. Id. at 471 (Conservation is defined as “the use of all methods and 
procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species…to the point at 
which the measures provided…are no longer necessary”).  
52. Id. at 472.  
53. Id. at 467. 
54. Id. at 473 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)). 
55. Id.   
56. Id.  
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“Under the APA, decisions ‘committed to agency discretion by law’ are 
not reviewable in federal court.”57 Actions receive agency discretion when 
there is no “meaningful standard” to judge their discretion against.58 
Consequently, the Service’s decision to not exclude Unit 1 for economic 
reasons was found to be unreviewable.  
 
B.  Commerce Clause 
  
 The court next examined the Landowners’ alternative argument 
that Unit 1’s critical habitat designation violated the Commerce Clause of 
the United States Constitution.59 Since the Landowners conceded that the 
designation of critical habitat is a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause, 
their contention was that the designation of Unit 1 went beyond the scope 
of that power.60 The Landowners argued that designation of Unit 1 is 
strictly intrastate commerce and “[t]here is simply no rational basis to 
conclude that the use of Unit 1 will substantially affect interstate 
commerce.”61 However, under the principle of aggregation, “intrastate 
activity can be regulated if it is ‘an essential part of a larger regulation of 
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut 
unless the intrastate activity is regulated.’”62 The court followed precedent 
and determined that the ESA is an economic regulatory scheme and that 
critical habitat designations are an essential component of that scheme.63 
In support of this conclusion, the court noted every other circuit that has 
faced similar challenges has upheld provisions of the ESA under the 
aggregation principle as a valid exercise of the Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power.64 
 
C.   National Environmental Policy Act 
 
 The court quickly disposed of the Landowners’ claim that the 
designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat violated NEPA because the Service 
did not prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) prior to 
designation.65 Under NEPA, an EIS is required if the federal action will 
“significantly affect [ ] the quality of the human environment” and “is not 
required for non-major action which does not have significant impact on 
the environment.”66 The court found that the critical habitat designation 
did not require physical changes to the environment and did not require 
the Landowners to take any action; therefore, NEPA’s impact statement 
                                                     
57. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).  
58. Id. (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)). 
59. Id. at 475. 
60. Id.    
61. Id.   
62. Id. at 476 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005)).  
63. Id. at 478.  
64. Id. at 477. 
65. Id. at 479. 
66. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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requirement was not triggered and the Service was not required to 
complete an EIS.67  
   
V.   THE DISSENT 
  
 Judge Priscilla R. Owen’s dissent states the “majority opinion’s 
holding is unprecedented and sweeping.”68 Judge Owen’s analysis focuses 
on the Service’s interpretation of the word “essential,” and that the 
Service’s interpretation of the term is not reasonable and “rejects the 
logical limits of the word ‘essential.’”69 The thrust of her argument 
revolved around the fact that Unit 1 plays no part in the conservation of 
the Frog, Unit 1 does not contain all the biological and physical 
characteristics that will support the Frog, and there is no probability that 
the necessary physical alterations will be made to Unit 1 to make it 
“essential” to the Frogs recovery. 70  
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 
 In conjunction with the holdings in Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. 
Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 555 (9th Cir. 2016), the holdings in the present case 
have set the Service’s designation of critical habitat up to be one of the 
most powerful and controversial provisions of the ESA. As species like 
the sage grouse, whose traditional habitat spanned much of the western 
United States, knock on the door of listing, the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
this case will have far reaching ramifications for both wildlife managers 
and private property owners. The dissent makes valid arguments towards 
confining the Service’s ability to define critical habitat, but precedent and 
statutory construction may lead the court in another direction.  
  
 
 
                                                     
67. Id. at 480.  
68. Id. at 481. 
69. Id. at 487. 
70. Id. at 480-481.   
